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This paper proposes that a strong ethical environment will be effective in reducing the 
tendency for managers to continue failing projects in both the presence and absence of agency 
problems. The findings support these propositions, with a strong ethical environment found to 
significantly reduce managers’ tendency to continue failing projects. Also, while agency 
problem effects were still present under a strong ethical environment, their impact was similar 
to the case of a weak ethical environment in the absence of agency problems. These findings 









The Impact of an Ethical Environment on Managers’ Project 
Evaluation Judgments under Agency Problem Conditions 
Introduction 
A large body of research has been conducted which examines decision bias in project 
evaluation decisions (for example, Staw 1976; Staw and Fox, 1977; Northcraft and Wolf, 
1984; Chenhall and Morris, 1991). The general tendency that emerges from this body of work 
is that under certain conditions managers are biased towards continuing failing projects; the 
escalation of commitment phenomenon (Brockner, 1992). One stream of this research 
supports the agency theory view that agency problems1 are an important set of conditions 
under which escalation of commitment to failing projects arises (Harrison and Harrell, 1993; 
Harrell and Harrison, 1994). Agency theory posits that an agency problem exists when 
managers’ economic interests differ from those of their firm (for example, a potential job 
promotion dependent on management of only successful projects) and they possess relevant 
information not available to their superiors (for example, private knowledge of a failing 
project which should be discontinued) (Baiman, 1982, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989). Under such 
conditions managers have both an incentive to act against the interests of the firm and the 
opportunity to do so without their superiors detecting their self-interested action. Under these 
conditions, the work of Harrell and Harrison suggests that managers will act in their own self-
interest to continue projects that are failing. Passmore (1995) and Rutledge and Karim (1999) 
have confirmed this finding in similar experimental studies.  
While these findings are consistent with the expanded view of rational decision-making 
incorporated into agency theory,2 recently Rutledge and Karim (1999) proposed that this 
decision-making model was incomplete as it ignored the influence of managers’ ethical 
reasoning on their economic decisions. Drawing upon Noreen’s (1988) critique of the 
boundaries of the applicability of the pure agency model, they argued that not all managers 
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are motivated by self-interest but may be constrained by their own ethical sensibility or 
conscience, and that this may explain why in Harrell and Harrison’s work some subjects who 
experienced agency problem conditions still acted in the interests of their firm. In short, if 
acting in one’s own interest against the interests of the firm is perceived as being unethical, 
then managers may moderate the tendency to continue failing projects.3 In a behavioral 
decision-making experiment, Rutledge and Karim (1999) found that the strongest tendency 
for managers to continue failing projects was where an agency problem existed and managers 
had relatively lower levels of ethical reasoning. However, where no agency problem existed 
or managers had relatively higher levels of ethical reasoning, then the tendency was for 
managers to make decisions consistent with the interests of the firm. 
Rutledge and Karim (1999) demonstrate that an improved model of managers’ decision-
making behaviour can be gained by including ethical considerations through variations in 
managers’ level of ethical reasoning. However, a manager’s level of ethical reasoning is only 
one source of the potential interaction of ethical considerations with agency problem 
conditions. Consistent with Noreen’s (1988) arguments that ethical behavior by managers 
might be more common than opportunistic behavior, it has been suggested that the “…ability 
to see and respond ethically may be related more to attributes of corporate culture than to 
attributes of individual employees” (Chen, Sawyer and Williams, 1997, p. 856, quoted in 
ICAC, 1998, p.10). Similarly, it has been argued that organizations can foster an ‘epidemic of 
ethical behaviour’ (Arnold, Lampe and Sutton, 1999, 2000) and act as ‘moral agents’ where 
ethical decisions involve more than individual values and standards (Metzger and Dalton, 
1996). Where the mission and values, leadership and management influence, peer group 
influence, procedures, rules and codes of ethics, ethics training, and rewards and sanctions of 
an organization are all directed to supporting ethical decision-making, they mutually reinforce 
each other to create a strong ethical environment that promotes greater levels of ethical 
decision making by all managers (Ford and Richardson, 1994).  
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A strong ethical environment provides a specific context within which an organization 
operates and all managers make decisions, and thereby can be considered as distinct from 
ethical reasoning, which is an internal characteristic of a manager. Therefore, regardless of 
their level of ethical reasoning, a strong ethical environment may lead to a general tendency 
for managers to act in the interests of their organizations and, more specifically, a reduced 
tendency for managers to act opportunistically under agency problem conditions. This 
proposition is consistent with the arguments by Arnold et al. (1999, 2000) that an organization 
can create an ethical culture that becomes contagious and ultimately leads to a more ethical 
organization. 
The purpose of this study is to provide another perspective on how an improved model 
of managers’ decision-making behavior can be derived. It does this by considering how one 
important component of the organizational context of decision-making, the strength of the 
ethical environment, influences managers’ economic decisions. Such a perspective is 
important as it moves beyond the individual traits (self-interest, ethical reasoning) focus in 
prior research to explicitly consider how the context within which managers’ make decisions 
impacts on their judgments.4  We propose that a strong ethical environment reduces project 
managers’ tendency to continue a failing project both in the absence and presence of agency 
problems. However, the impact of a strong ethical environment is expected to be stronger in 
the latter case than the former. Thus, we also propose an interaction effect between the form 
of ethical environment and agency problem conditions. These propositions are explored in a 
behavioral decision-making experiment and support is found for the proposed role of strong 
ethical environments in reducing escalation of commitment to failing projects.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The first section develops 
hypotheses based upon the prior research on agency theory and arguments on how an ethical 
environment may impact upon managers’ economic decisions both generally and specifically 
in the case of agency problems. The second section overviews the research design, dependent 
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and independent variables and the third presents the results of the experiment. The final 
section discusses the results, presents conclusions derived from the study and provides 
suggestions for future research. 
Hypothesis Development 
Agency theory and managers’ project evaluation decisions 
Consistent with Conlon and Leatherwood’s (1989) proposal to consider approaches that 
provide rational economic explanations rather than just irrational affective ones for managers’ 
tendency to continue failing projects, a number of experimental and analytic studies have 
considered agency theory explanations for managers’ normatively incorrect project evaluation 
decisions (Kanodia, Bushman and Dickhaut, 1989; Harrison and Harrell, 1993; Harrell and 
Harrison, 1994; Passmore, 1995; Rutledge and Karim, 1999). Agency theory models the 
relationships between principals (for instance, a firm’s senior management) and agents (for 
instance, project managers) in terms of contracts to perform certain duties. It posits that an 
agent will act in her/his own interests, and that where these interests are not aligned with those 
of the principal, the ‘incentive’ element of an agency problem exists (Baiman, 1982, 1990; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). However, the agent only has the opportunity to exploit this incentive if a 
state of information asymmetry (that is, where the principal does not possess information 
available to the agent which is needed to monitor the agent’s actions) provides an opportunity 
for the agent to act in his/her self-interest without detection by the principal. When both an 
incentive and opportunity to act in their self-interest exist, than agency theory proposes that an 
agency problem exists, and agents are expected to make decisions that are aligned with their 
self-interests rather than with the interests of the principal (Baiman, 1982, 1990; Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Under agency problem conditions agency theory proposes that it would be economically 
rational for managers to continue projects that are failing. For example, if a project manager’s 
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reward, promotion or career prospects were dependent on managing only successful projects 
and his/her superiors did not possess sufficient information to evaluate project profitability 
independently, then it may be in the project manager’s economic interests to continue a failing 
project even though this is against the profit maximizing interests of the organization. 
Harrison and Harrell (1993), Harrell and Harrison (1994), Passmore (1995) and Rutledge and 
Karim (1999) provide experimental evidence that consistently supports the agency theory 
explanation for such bias in managers’ project evaluation decisions. These studies found that 
there is a lower tendency for managers to terminate a failing project when the agency problem 
conditions of an incentive for managers to act in their self-interest and information asymmetry 
are present. These findings provide the problem domain for this study. 
The impact of ethics on agency problem induced bias in managers’ project evaluation 
decisions 
The problem domain of this study is examined in the context of Noreen’s (1988) 
arguments that in practice the standard agency problem outcome of self-interested decisions 
might be a special case; that is, that ethical behavior may be more common than opportunistic 
behavior. He proposed that more research should consider the situations under which standard 
agency outcomes do not hold even though the necessary theoretical conditions are present. 
One such boundary condition is variation in the ethical attributes of managers. Within the 
context of managers’ normatively incorrect project evaluation decisions, Rutledge and Karim 
(1999) provide support for Noreen’s arguments in terms of how differences in manager’s 
moral reasoning abilities interact with agency problems. This study considers another 
boundary condition, variation in the ethical environments of organizations. 
Ethics as an attribute of managers 
Rutledge and Karim (1999) contrast agency theory’s assumption that an individual’s 
actions are based upon extreme and immediate self-interest and a selfish character with a 
counter assumption that individuals may have an altruistic or unselfish belief system. They 
argued that such a belief system might exist for managers with a high level of ethical 
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reasoning. Citing prior research findings (Ponemon, 1992, 1993; Tsui and Gul, 1996) of a 
direct positive relationship between higher levels of ethical and moral reasoning and more 
ethical actions, Rutledge and Karim (1999) suggested that managers with high ethical and 
moral reasoning may act in an ethically correct way rather than an agency theory 
opportunistic way. Using these two potentially conflicting views about individual preferences 
and beliefs, Rutledge and Karim (1999) proposed that project managers’ with a low level of 
ethical and moral reasoning would be more likely to act in their own self-interest than project 
managers’ with a high level of ethical reasoning, and that this difference in decision behavior 
would be greater where agency problem conditions exist.  
Rutledge and Karim (1999) conducted a decision-making experiment based on the 
Harrell and Harrison (1994) study using a 2 x 2 factorial design. One independent variable 
was the absence or presence of agency problem conditions (both misaligned interests and 
private information) and the second was the ethical reasoning level (higher or lower) of 
subjects. They found a significant interaction between agency problem conditions and project 
managers’ ethical reasoning level. The project evaluation decisions of managers with a high 
ethical reasoning level were not significantly influenced by the presence of agency problem 
conditions. However, managers with a low ethical reasoning level had a greater tendency to 
continue a failing project under agency problem conditions than in their absence. This 
supported their argument that agency theory explanations for decision bias should not be 
substantial for managers with a high level of ethical reasoning (Rutledge and Karim, 1999, 
p.176). 
Ethics as an attribute of organizations 
The level of ethical reasoning of managers is only one element of the ethical context of 
economic decision-making that might limit agency problems (Noreen, 1988). It has been 
suggested by others that the “…ability to see and respond ethically may be related more to 
attributes of corporate culture than to attributes of individual employees” (Chen, Sawyer and 
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Williams, 1997, p. 856, quoted in ICAC, 1998, p.10). Similarly, Arnold et al. (1999, 2000) 
argue for creating ethically driven organizations that foster an epidemic of ethical behaviour, 
Metzger and Dalton (1996) conceptualize organizations as ‘moral agents’ where ethical 
decisions involve more than individual values and standards, and the New South Wales 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)5 argues that the organization is a 
“…very powerful influence which has the potential to make an ethical person act unethically 
or an ethical person behave ethically” (ICAC, 2000, p. 1).  
These arguments suggest that attributes of an organization’s internal environment can 
directly impact upon decisions made by managers separately from individual managers’ levels 
of ethical and moral reasoning. Consistent with these views, it is proposed in this paper that 
the general ethical environment within an organization, and in its industry, may promote a 
climate of ethical decision-making, which in turn may mitigate agency problem induced 
tendencies for managers to continue failing projects.  
ICAC (1998), drawing on Ford and Richardson (1994), identifies eight factors that 
influence the ethical environment of an organization, six of which are relevant to the 
arguments above; mission and values, leadership and management influence, peer group 
influence, procedures, rules and codes of ethics, ethics training, and rewards and sanctions.6 
The potential impact of each these factors on ethical behavior in an organization is 
summarized in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The first three factors (mission and values, leadership and management influence and 
peer group influence) reflect the important role that social norms, particularly moral ones, 
may play in creating a general social environment in which people are exposed to social 
pressure not to act opportunistically (Noreen, 1988). Such arguments are consistent with the 
well-documented powerful effects of social and organizational norms on the actions of social 
actors (for example, Beyer, 1981; Brunsson, 1982; Gowler and Legge, 1983). For example, 
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institutional theory provides numerous examples of how normative isomorphism exerts 
pressure for decision-makers and their organizations to conform to the expectations of inter-
organizational networks of professional groups (Zucker, 1983, 1987). Therefore, such 
literature provides broad general support for the expectations summarized in Table 1 that 
where a strong environment of organizational norms supports ethical decision-making, this 
creates significant social pressures to conform that reduce the motivation for managers to act 
in their self-interest where these are not aligned with the interests of the organization. In 
addition, further social pressure is brought upon individual members to act consistently with 
the ethical culture of the organization if other managers publicly act consistently with that 
culture and senior management is seen to support this behavior (Arnold et. al., 1999). 
The fourth and fifth factors (procedures, rules and codes of ethics, and ethics training) 
reflect the role that social practices have in reinforcing social norms. Norms of ethical 
behavior may be reinforced within an organization by the creation and deployment of various 
procedures and policies aimed at both encouraging and requiring ethical decision-making on a 
wide range of organizational activities. The creation of such ethical procedures and policies 
has become more common and highly visible in many commercial organizations since the 
(so-called) excesses of the 1980s (Louwers, Ponemon and Radtke, 1997). The most explicit 
example of such procedures and policies are Codes of Ethics, which are increasingly imposed 
by commercial organizations (Farrell and Farrell, 1997; Wiley, 1995). The existence of such 
organizational practices explicitly supporting ethical decision-making provides regular, 
concrete reinforcement of ethical norms of behavior. 
Finally, the sixth factor (rewards and sanctions) emphasizes the well know finding that 
alignment of organizational reward systems with desired goals and behaviors is critical for the 
successful achievement of these goals and behaviors (for example, Merchant, 1989). 
Therefore, if an organization puts in place all the other above five factors that act to create an 
ethical environment, then it is also important that it both rewards ethical behavior through 
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either explicit public promotion of adherence to its ethical standards and/or by explicit 
recognition in its promotion and compensation systems, and also has clear public sanctions 
for breaches of its ethical standards. 
Therefore, it is argued that the existence of organizational and social norms that support 
ethical behavior, their reinforcement through visible adherence to ethical attitudes and 
behavior by other managers and through explicit ethically based procedures and policies, and 
linkages to reward systems can create a strong ethical environment within an organization 
(see Arnold et al., 1999, 2000; Ford and Richardson, 1994; ICAC, 1998, 2000; Metzger and 
Dalton, 1996). As Arnold et al. (1999) argue, the distinguishing feature of organizations in the 
final fourth stage of their transitional model of ethical organizational development is their 
“…consistent application of an ethical orientation to decision making throughout the 
organization, at all levels of employees, and over an extensive period of time” (1998, p.12). 
Arnold et al. (1999) present examples of organizations that they argue exemplify such total 
integration of ethical behavior; Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream (Miller, 1995; Wiesendanger, 
1993) and Johnson & Johnson (Greenwald, 1986; Johnson, 1989). In combination, the above 
arguments suggest that a strong ethical environment will create a general tendency for 
managers to more strongly align their behavior with the norms of the organization, resulting 
in greater levels of ethical decision making by all managers within the organization. This 
should lead to project managers making project evaluation decisions that are more consistent 
with the interests of the organization than where the ethical environment is weaker, regardless 
of any individual manager’s personal level of ethical reasoning.  
To examine the above propositions we propose a main effect for a strong ethical 
environment in our behavioral decision-making experiment. Accordingly, the first hypothesis 
of this study is:  
H1. Project managers who are subject to a strong ethical environment will exhibit a greater 
tendency to terminate a failing project than project managers who are subject to a 
weak ethical environment. 
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The main effect for a strong ethical environment is likely to act in a counter direction to 
the agency problem main effect established in the prior literature (specifically, Harrison and 
Harrell, 1993; Harrell and Harrison, 1994; Rutledge and Karim, 1999), as Rutledge and Karim 
(1999) found for project managers with a high level of ethical reasoning. That is, we expect 
that a strong ethical environment will act to constrain project managers’ agency problem 
motivated decision-making behavior. This leads us to propose an interaction effect between 
the strength of the ethical environment and the presence of agency problems. 
In addition to the arguments presented for H1, two sets of arguments suggest further 
ways in which a strong ethical environment may specifically reduce managers’ self-interest 
incentives where an agency problem exists. The first set of arguments is drawn from the 
similarity between our view on the role of an ethical environment and professional 
pronouncements on the critical role of management integrity and ethical environments as part 
of an effective internal control environment to reduce financial fraud (SAS No. 78 and No. 
82; COSO, 1992). Several studies of internal control where accountants had a motivation and 
opportunity to engage in fraudulent reporting provide support for these pronouncements. 
While Rich, Smith and Mihalek (1990) and Brief, Dukerich, Brown and Brett (1996) found 
no support for codes of conduct acting in isolation to influence how individuals resolved 
ethical dilemmas, they did conclude that ethical environments were important in such cases. 
D’Aquila (1998) conducted an experiment with members of the AICPA that tested the 
individual and combined effects of 1) senior management support for ethical decisions, 2) 
implementation of codes of conduct, and 3) actions that did not create pressure or link 
compensation to achieving short-term performance targets, on the propensity to fairly report 
financial information. She found that in combination these three control environment factors 
increased the propensity to fairly report, and that senior management support was the only 
individual factor that did so. While these studies do not directly address project managers’ 
project evaluation judgments, they lend support to the argument that a strong ethical 
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environment will reduce the tendency for managers to act in their self-interest under agency 
problem conditions.  
The second set of arguments is drawn from agency theory, which proposes that the 
tendency to act opportunistically will be reduced under agency problem conditions where 
agents believe that there is either a high probability of punishment if detected and/or the 
punishment is likely to be severe (Baiman, 1982, 1990). It is proposed that where a strong 
ethical environment exists agents will assign a higher probability to both the likelihood and 
severity of punishment if they are detected acting opportunistically.7 Thus, even when the 
probability of detection is low due to the presence of information asymmetry, project 
managers’ higher punishment assessments under a strong as opposed to weak ethical 
environment will reduce the motivation to act in their self-interest.  
Overall, therefore, when agency problem conditions are present, project managers who 
experience a weak ethical environment will have no countervailing influences to their self-
interest and will act to satisfy these by continuing failing projects. In contrast, those who 
experience a strong ethical environment will be exposed to a range of countervailing 
influences that send a strong signal of the need to act ethically, and thus will not act on their 
self-interest. However, when agency problem conditions are absent, a strong ethical 
environment will have less impact. While the main effect arguments for an ethical 
environment suggest that all managers will make more ethical decisions under a strong ethical 
environment, in the absence of agency problems conditions there are no clear incentives for 
managers operating under a weak ethical environment to act against the interests of their 
organization by continuing a failing project. Therefore, we would expect the impact of a 
strong ethical environment might vary across different agency problem conditions. 
Accordingly, the second hypothesis of this study is: 
H2 The increased likelihood of project managers’ tendencies to terminate failing projects 
for project mangers who are subject to a strong ethical environment will be greater 
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where agency problem conditions are present (i.e. both an incentive and opportunity 
for mangers to act in their self-interest exist) then when they are absent. 
Research method 
Overview of design 
Based upon the decision-making case used by Harrell and Harrison (1994), a laboratory 
experiment was conducted to investigate hypotheses 1 and 2. A 2x2 fully crossed factorial 
experimental design was used, with agency problem (present/absent) and ethical environment 
(strong/weak) as the independent variables. The dependent variable was subjects’ preference 
for dis/continuing a project. The subjects, procedures and variables are described in the 
following subsections. 
Subjects 
A total of 131 subjects took part in the experiment. The subjects were middle managers 
who were completing a part-time MBA at a major university. There were 77 (61%) males and 
49 (39%) females8 and their average age was 32 years (range 23 to 48).9 The subjects had, on 
average, 10 years of work experience (range 1 to 28 years), with 74% having 5 or more years 
of experience.10 This experience covered a range of general management and functional 
occupations in both services and manufacturing activities, with the main areas being general 
management (16%), financial roles (13%), engineering (13%), sales (7.6%) and marketing 
(5.3%). As mature subjects with significant real world business and management experience, 
they were considered appropriate for the decision-making task used in this experiment.   
As the subjects were volunteers they were offered incentives to both take part in the 
experiment and to increase their motivation to complete the task. They were told that on 
completion of the experiment their name would be entered in a draw for a prize of a book 
voucher. There were three levels of prizes for each experimental session – the first prize had a 
value of $48, the second $32 and third prize $16. Overall, subjects had a 1-in-10 chance of 
wining a prize. To take part in the prize draw, subjects entered their name and contact details 
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on a sheet separate to the experimental instruments. They handed the sheet to the 
experimenter at the conclusion of the session, independently of their anonymously completed 
instruments. A random draw was conducted after the completion of the session, the winners 
announced and the prizes were mailed in the week after the experiment was held. 
Procedures 
All subjects completed an experimental task adapted from that used by Harrell and 
Harrison (1994), who had designed the task to address the major criticisms of prior 
experimental tasks used in the literature (Conlon and Leatherwood, 1989). The task instructed 
subjects to assume the role of a project manager who had four years ago initiated a project 
with an estimated seven-year life. When initiated, the seven-year cash flow projections for the 
project were profitable ($270,000 per year on a $1,000,000 investment), and the actual cash 
flows for the first four years had exceeded projections ($320,000 per year). However, the 
projections for the remaining three years indicate a sharp decline (to $50,000 per year) that 
will make the project unprofitable. The net present value of the remaining life of the project 
was indicated to be $144,327, while its salvage value if discontinued after four years was 
indicated to be $177,500. The decision for the project manager at this time was whether to 
continue or discontinue the project. The normatively correct decision was to terminate the 
project. 
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of four cases. The first version of the case 
contained the basic project information indicated above, and the ‘absent’ agency problem and 
‘weak’ ethical environment conditions. The second and third versions of the case contained 
the basic information plus manipulations of either the agency problem or ethical environment 
conditions. The fourth version contained the basic information plus manipulations of both 
conditions.  
All subjects were given a package consisting of an instruction sheet, their case version 
and debriefing questionnaire consisting of manipulation check and demographic questions. 
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The experimenter led the subjects through the instructions and then instructed them to turn to 
the decision case. When they had completed the decision case they were instructed to 
complete the debriefing questionnaire. Subjects took on average between 15 and 20 minutes 
to complete the experiment. 
Dependent variable 
The subjects reached their continuance or discontinuance decisions on a 10-point scale 
that has been used in similar prior experiments (Harrison and Harrell, 1993; Harrell and 
Harrison, 1994; Passmore, 1995; Ho and Vera-Muñoz, 1998; Rutledge and Karim, 1999). The 
scale was divided at its mid-point (between 5 and 6) and labeled so that a choice of 1 to 5 
indicated a continuance decision and a choice of 6 to 10 indicated a discontinuance decision. 
The end points were anchored for ‘definitely’ continue or discontinue. Thus, the larger the 
numerical response indicated by a subject the greater the tendency to terminate the project 
(with scores of 5 or less against the normatively correct decision and scores of 6 or more in 
accord with the normatively correct decision). 
Independent variables 
The two independent variables were agency problem (present/absent) and ethical 
environment (strong/weak). The agency problem manipulation mirrored that used by Harrell 
and Harrison (1994) and Rutledge and Karim (1999). In the ‘absent’ agency problem 
condition the project manager was cast as a senior project manager with a solid industry 
reputation for project management gained over a number of years. A single failed project 
would not damage this well-established reputation. In addition, it was stated that information 
about the project’s unprofitable future performance was widely known to others in the firm 
and industry, indicating that the manager had no information asymmetry advantage. Thus, 
there was no incentive or opportunity to act against the interests of the firm. The ‘present’ 
agency problem condition manipulated both the incentive and opportunity to act in the 
manager’s self-interest. The manager was cast as a junior project manager with a growing 
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reputation for completing profitable projects. The manager had recently received an informal 
job offer with another company for a promotion and substantial salary increase, but this offer 
would be withdrawn if the manager had a failed project. It was also stated that the project’s 
expected decline in performance was known only to the project manager and would not 
become known by others until the projects completion in three years time (For details see the 
Appendix in Rutledge and Karim, 1999). 
The ethical environment condition was developed for this study. In the ‘weak’ condition 
subjects were told no explicit information about the ethical environment within the firm. In 
the ‘strong’ ethical environment condition subjects were told about conditions existing in the 
firm and industry that aligned with the factors11 described in Table 1 that influence the ethical 
environment of an organization. Mission and Values: that their company operated in an 
industry where high ethical standards were valued and that their company actively supported 
the industry association stance on ethical behavior. Leadership and Management Influence: 
that managers in their company had always practiced in an environment where 
trustworthiness, respect, justice, fairness and honesty were of paramount importance and that 
their superior held them personally responsible for adherence to the industry Code of Ethics. 
Peer Group Influence: that based upon personal observation of other managers, they believed 
that there was a high level of adherence to the industry Code of Ethics within the company 
and the industry. Procedures, Rules and Codes of Ethics: that the industry association had a 
Code of Ethics that formalized the industry’s long-standing expectations for high ethical 
standards and that their company had adopted the industry code of ethics as its own internal 
code. Rewards and Sanctions: that the industry association operated an Ethical Practice 
Review Board that investigated breaches of the Code of Ethics, recommended sanctions to 
senior management in member companies and published its investigations in the association’s 
widely read monthly magazine, and that their company explicitly valued ethical behavior in 
its reward and evaluation systems.  
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As well as mirroring the factors in Table 1, the elements of a strong ethical environment 
mirror many of the elements of highly ethical organizations discussed in Arnold et al. (1999), 
and are consistent with the elements of an effective internal control environment discussed by 
D’Aquila (1998). Finally, the manipulations focus solely on aspects of an ethical environment 
that are independent of an implicit or explicit imputation of the manager’s own level of ethical 
reasoning. These manipulations were developed and refined in pilot tests involving two prior 
experiments using undergraduate business students as subjects. In the pilot testing they were 
found to induce the desired decision-making behavior. The full strong ethical environment 
manipulation is shown in the Appendix. 
Manipulation checks 
Two manipulation checks were conducted in relation to subjects' perceptions of agency 
problem conditions and one manipulation check was conducted into subjects' perceptions of 
the ethical environment. The agency problem condition questions asked whether the 
information about the project was common knowledge and whether another company had 
initiated confidential discussion about recruiting them to a more important position with a 
substantially higher salary. The ethical environment question asked whether ethical behavior 
by managers was valued in their company and a Code of Ethics was in place to formalise such 
expectations. Of the 51 subject that failed manipulation checks, 23 (17.5%) subjects failed 
one or both of the agency problem manipulation checks, 13 (9.9%) failed the ethical 
environment manipulation check and 15 (11.4%) failed all three manipulation checks. 
Due to the high failure rate, the analysis reported in the next section was repeated using 
only the 80 subjects who responded correctly to all the manipulation check questions. As the 
results from the analysis with the reduced data set did not differ significantly12 from the 
analysis using the complete set of subjects, only the latter is reported in this paper. 
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Data analysis and results 
Statistical tests 
An overall 2x2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was conducted. This test was used to 
establish whether there was a significant difference between the agency problem treatment 
groups, the ethical environment treatment groups (H1) and to test for any interaction between 
agency problem and ethical environment (H2) treatments. All analyses were conducted using 
SYSTAT 1013 at an alpha level of 0.05. 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the four treatments are reported in Table 2. Some general 
trends are apparent from these descriptive statistics. On average, subjects who experienced 
agency problem conditions expressed a relatively lower tendency (5.338) to terminate a 
failing project than subjects who did not experience agency problem conditions (6.561). 
Similarly, subjects who were subject to a weak ethical environment expressed a relatively 
lower tendency (5.277) to terminate a failing project than subjects who were subject to a 
strong ethical environment (6.621). Further, the difference in tendency to terminate projects 
where agency problems were present (1.364) is fairly similar to the difference in tendency to 
terminate projects were agency problems were absent (1.270). Finally, only subjects who 
experienced agency problems in a weak ethical environment made, on average, a project 
continuation decision (score of 5 or less), which was against the normatively correct decision. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Hypotheses testing 
The ANOVA, reported in Table 3, shows a significant agency problem main effect 
(F1,127 = 5.249, p = 0.024). The mean response given by project managers (refer Table 2) who 
experienced agency conditions (5.338) is significantly lower than the mean response given by 
project mangers who did not experience an agency problem (6.561). This indicates that the 
former managers were less likely to terminate the failing project than the latter. This finding, 
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as expected, is consistent with the prior finding of Harrison and Harrell (1993), Harrell and 
Harrison (1994), Passmore (1995) and Rutledge and Karim (1999). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that project managers who are subject to a strong ethical 
environment would exhibit a greater tendency to terminate a failing project than project 
managers who are subject to a weak ethical environment. As indicated in Tables 2 and 3, the 
mean response given by project managers who experienced a strong ethical environment 
(6.621) is significantly higher (F1,127 = 6.407, p = 0.013) than the mean response provided by 
subjects who experienced a weak ethical environment (5.277), which shows that the former 
managers were more likely to terminate the failing project than the latter. This provides 
support for hypothesis 1. 
Finally, hypothesis 2 predicted that the difference in the tendency to terminate a failing 
project between a strong and weak ethical environment would be greater where project 
mangers experience agency problem conditions than where they did not experience them. The 
results for the interaction between agency and ethical environment (refer Table 3) show that 
the difference in tendency to terminate a failing project between strong and weak ethical 
environments is not significantly different between managers experiencing agency problems 
and those not experiencing agency problems (F1,127 = 0.008, p = 0.928). Hence, hypothesis 2 
is not supported.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Based on the analysis of the two main effects and the interaction, it is concluded that the 
significant main effect for agency problem supports the finding of prior studies that agency 
problems reduce managers’ tendencies to terminate unprofitable projects; that is, agency 
problem conditions induce escalation of commitment.  In terms of controlling such behavior, 
the significant main effect for ethical environment supports the proposition that a strong 
ethical environment increases managers’ tendencies to terminate such projects in general; that 
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is, to make the normatively correct decision whether agency problem conditions are present or 
not.  Further, while there was no significant interaction, only subjects who experienced 
agency problems in a weak ethical environment made, on average, the normatively incorrect 
decision to continue the project. Also, on average, the decisions of subjects who experienced a 
weak ethical environment and no agency problems are very similar to those who experienced 
a strong ethical environment and agency problems, as illustrated in Figure 1.  Taken together 
these results provide some indication that a strong ethical environment may provide some 
counter to the effect of agency problems.  
Discussion and conclusions 
Agency theory proposes that under conditions of an agency problem, it is economically 
rational for managers to continue with projects that are failing. However, as Noreen (1988) 
argued, under agency problem conditions in practice not all managers display opportunistic 
behavior. Such arguments suggest that the expanded view of rational decision-making 
incorporated in agency theory is incomplete. Rutledge and Karim (1999) recently provided 
evidence that managers’ high ethical predisposition may reduce managers’ tendency to act in 
their self-interest; thereby providing one set of conditions under which managers may make 
rational decisions that do not display opportunistic behavior. This paper set out to examine 
another potential set of such conditions, the general ethical environment in which managers 
make decisions. 
Research questions were developed and tested in a behavioral decision-making 
experiment. The presence and absence of agency problem conditions was manipulated along 
with the elements of an ethical environment. It was anticipated that the presence of a strong 
ethical environment would induce managers to act in the normatively correct manner by 
deciding to terminate the project regardless of the presence or absence of agency problem 
conditions. Further, it was expected that where agency problem conditions induced managers 
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to act opportunistically by deciding to continue a failing project a strong ethical environment 
would mitigate such a tendency. In combination, it was expected that the greatest tendency for 
managers to act opportunistically would be under agency problem conditions combined with a 
weak ethical environment and that the opposite set of conditions would result in the greatest 
tendency for managers to make the normatively correct decision. 
The statistically significant difference between the mean responses of project managers 
experiencing agency problem conditions versus those that did not confirmed previous 
findings by Harrison and Harrell (1993), Harrell and Harrison (1994) and Rutledge and Karim 
(1999) that the presence of agency problem conditions induces managers to make project 
evaluation decisions which are in their self-interest, but against the interests of their 
organization. However, the statistically significant difference between the mean responses of 
project managers experiencing a strong ethical environment versus those that did not 
(hypothesis 1) indicated that the presence of a strong ethical environment increases the 
tendency for project managers to make decisions aligned with the interests of their 
organization under both the presence and absence of agency problem conditions. The 
strongest impact of a strong ethical environment was found where there are no agency 
problem conditions, but a strong ethical environment also reduces the impact of agency 
problems when they are present. While no significant interaction was found between agency 
problem and ethical environment conditions (hypothesis 2), it is of note that project managers 
who experienced a weak ethical environment and no agency problem conditions made similar 
project termination decisions to managers who experienced a strong ethical environment and 
agency problems conditions. 
The most important implication of these findings is that the creation of a strong ethical 
environment represents a viable control design alternative for an organization attempting to 
provide a general decision environment that aligns managers’ interests with those of the 
organization. The findings indicate that by focusing on creating an environment where the 
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organization’s mission and values are built upon strong ethical values, where the leadership of 
the organization acts in ways to explicitly support such mission and values, as do all members 
of the organization, where these values as given existence in a Code of Ethics and in other 
relevant organizational procedures and rules, and where organizational rewards and sanctions 
are explicitly aligned to support ethical values and behavior, then the organization can 
promote greater levels of ethical decision making by all managers (Ford and Richardson, 
1994; ICAC, 1998, 2000). The findings also lend support to the arguments of Chen, Sawyer 
and Williams (1997) that acting ethically may be related more to corporate culture than to the 
attributes of employees and of Arnold et al. (1999, 2000) that an organization can create an 
ethical culture that becomes contagious and ultimately leads to a more ethical organization. 
Further, the findings suggest that a strong ethical environment mitigates to some extent 
project managers’ pursuit of opportunistic behavior. Traditional control alternatives to such 
agency problems have included considerations of alignment of monetary reward systems with 
the interest of the firm, and the introduction of more elaborate accounting systems to monitor 
the agent’s decisions. A more recently identified alternative is the selection of managers with 
a high ethical predisposition (Rutledge and Karim, 1999). The findings in this paper suggest 
that organizations that believe there may be agency problems with their managers should 
consider creating a strong ethical environment as an alternative to directly removing agency 
problem conditions, which is often not a practical alternative.  
A second implication of the findings in this study is the provision of further insights into 
the generalizability of agency theory in the domain of accounting-based economic decisions. 
Rutledge and Karim (1999) provided evidence that “…agency models of self-interest based 
managerial decision-making are incomplete and need to be refined to include other potential 
influences” (p. 181) by showing that managerial self-interest was not acted upon where 
managers had a personal high ethical predisposition. This study has provided some evidence 
that aspects of the decision context in which managers make economic decisions based upon 
 22 
accounting information, specifically the strength of the ethical environment in the 
organization, may also mitigate the role of self-interest. Therefore, we propose that further 
examination of the relationship of the agency theory assumption that behavior can be 
explained solely by a focus on self-interest with the conditions of a strong ethical environment 
is warranted. 
The findings presented in this paper have to be interpreted within the context of the 
strengths and limitations of this study. A laboratory study was used to examine the effect of 
ethical environments and agency problem conditions, because it provides a high degree of 
internal validity. The research instrument was based on an existing instrument developed by 
Harrell and Harrison (1994), which provided further validity to this study. However, as with 
most laboratory studies of this type, the case situations are simplified abstractions of the real 
world, and care needs to be taken to generalize from this abstraction. Further, as this is the 
first study examining ethical environments within organizations as a behavioral control 
option, further refinements are possible to the case descriptions relating to the ethical 
environment.  
Future research could build on this study by attempting to refine the elements of a 
strong ethical environment included in this study. For example, future research could consider 
the relative importance of linking ethical behavior to rewards and evaluation systems versus 
the manager’s belief that there is a high level of adherence (i.e. socialized effect) to ethical 
environment in the organization. In addition, future research could explore the impacts of how 
the elements of a strong ethical environment are combined and/or identify other potential 
elements. Along with the refinements to the ethical environment variable, a further extension 
would be to examine how managers’ ethical predisposition (Rutledge and Karim, 1999) 
interacts with a strong ethical environment. As Rutledge and Karim found ethical 
predisposition to be a strong moderator to agency problem conditions, it would be interesting 
to see if it is as important in organizations providing strong ethical environments. If ethical 
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predispositions lose their importance in the context of strong ethical environments then this 
will have direct consequences to hiring and training policies in organizations. Another 
desirable extension could investigate whether participation in the formulation of the 
organization’s ethical policy has effects on subsequent decisions by project managers. This 
study has only examined the context where subjects had no explicit role in the development of 
the ethical code. It would be interesting to determine whether the effectiveness of 
environmental context is more or less effective where subjects have the environmental context 
imposed on them versus being part of its development.  
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Appendix.  Strong ethical environment case scenario  
 
Williams Company operates in an industry where high ethical standards are valued. The 
Industry Association has for several years had a Code of Ethics that formalised the industry’s 
long-standing expectations for high ethical standards in managers. The Industry Association 
has an Ethical Practice Review Board that investigates any breaches of this code and 
recommends sanctions to senior management in member companies. Outcomes of such 
investigations are reported in the Industry Association’s monthly magazine, which is read 
widely in the industry. Managers in the Williams Company have always practiced in a 
company environment where trustworthiness, respect, justice, fairness and honesty are of 
paramount importance. Williams Company actively and strongly supports the Industry 
Association stance on ethical behaviour and has adopted the Industry Association Code of 
Ethics as its own internal code. To further encourage adherence to the Code of Ethics, 
Williams Company explicitly values ethical behaviour in its reward and evaluation systems. 
As part of these systems, your superior holds you personally responsible for adherence to the 
Code of Ethics. Based upon personal observation of the behaviour of other managers within 
your company and in others in the industry, you believe there is a high level of adherence to 
the Code of Ethics both within Williams company and within the industry generally. 
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Table 1 Factors that influence the ethical environment of an organization 
Factors Impacts on Ethical Behavior Key References 
Mission and 
values 
A clear mission and values help create the shared sets of 
beliefs that guide decision-making. Where these are 
built around strong ethical values they can reinforce 
ethical decision-making norms. In addition, ethical 
decisions are increased where managers strongly 
identify with the organization.  
Ping, 1996 
Kitson & Campbell, 1996 
Akaah, 1992 




Staff are more likely to follow what they see their 
superiors do than adhere to an ethics policy. In 
particular, explicit formal or informal CEO support for 
ethical behavior results in more ethical decisions. 
Equally, observation of senior managers acting contrary 
to ethical expectations undermines the ethical 
development of an organization. 
Andrews, 1989 
Soutar, McNeil & Molster, 1994 
Hegarty & Sims, 1979 
Cooke & Zipparo, 1998 
Ford & Richardson, 1994 
Peer group 
influence 
Individuals will adhere to group norms even though this 
may be against what they would do as individuals 
(groupthink effect). In addition, the ‘risky-shift’ group 
effect, where groups make higher risk decisions than as 
individuals, may strengthen the groupthink effect 
because in such cases individuals do not see the group 
outcome as their responsibility. Thus ethical groups 
may induce individuals with low moral reasoning to act 
ethically or unethical groups may induce individuals 
with high moral reasoning to act unethically.  




Ford & Richardson, 1994 
Procedures, rules 
and codes of 
ethics 
The existence of codes of ethics and defined procedures, 
rule and roles are perceived as supporting higher ethical 
behavior. Existence of codes also increases perceptions 
that the organization has a greater concern for ethical 
behavior. However, codes must be supported by clear 
accompanying sanctions to be effective. 
Ferrell & Skinner, 1988 
Rich, Smith & Mihalek, 1990 
Laczniak & Inderrieden, 1987 
Ford & Richardson, 1994 
Ethics training Appropriately focused ethics training, particularly that 
with a practical rather than philosophical emphasis, can 
assist in encouraging ethical decision-making. Training 
can make codes of ethics concrete, but must be seen as 
consistent with the other factors. 
Brumback, 1991 
Barker, 1993 
Ford & Richardson, 1994 
Rewards and 
sanctions 
Unethical behavior is increased if it is aligned with 
organizational rewards and decreased if ethical 
decisions are so aligned. Unethical behavior is 
decreased where there is a clear threat of punishment. In 
particular, punishment having a social, public aspect 
will be more effective than private punishment. 
Hegarty & Sims, 1978 
Chonko & Hunt, 1985 
Ford & Richardson, 1994 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
  Ethical environment  
































































Note: Lower values (5 or less) indicate a decision to continue a project, while higher 




Table 3 Analysis of variance 
Analysis of variance 
Source Sum-of squares df Mean-square F p (2-tailed) 
Ethical environment 56.803 1 56.803 6.407 0.013 
Agency problem 46.535 1 46.535 5.249 0.024 
Eth. Env. x Agency  0.073 1 0.073 0.008 0.928 
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1 The general set of agency issues explored in prior papers has been referred to as adverse selection. As 
they may also be construed as applying to a moral hazard situation, we prefer to use the more general 
term of agency problems. 
2  It should be noted that the majority of research on managers’ decision bias in project evaluations have 
focused on irrational explanations such as a manager’s self-justification of prior commitment to a project 
(Brockner, 1992). 
3 This proposition is consistent with the growing body of research on ethics in accounting settings (see 
Louwers et al., 1997 for a review). For example, Ponemon (1993) found that higher ethical development 
of students was associated with reduced free-riding behavior in an economic choice experiment and 
Arnold and Ponemon (1991) found that internal auditors with higher ethical development were more 
likely to disclose sensitive audit findings even when it was not in their own interests (that is, retaliation by 
management was likely). 
4 Similarly, D’Aquila (1998) argues that research on financial reporting decisions has focused more on 
individual traits than on a firm’s internal control environment, despite the latter’s identification as the 
foundation for all other internal control components. 
5 The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), created by the ICAC Act 1988, is a State 
public authority, independent of the government of the day, that is accountable to the people of New 
South Wales (Australia) through the New South Wales Parliament. Its aims are to protect the public 
interest, prevent breaches of public trust and guide the conduct of public officials (see 
www.icac.nsw.gov.au). 
6 The other two factors are features of the organization (covering scarcity of resources, environmental 
dynamism, size, prior ethical violations and industry) and corporatization and privatization of public 
section organizations. Neither of these factors is directly related to the creation and operation of an ethical 
environment as conceived in this paper. 
7 They may also believe that the probability of detection increases due to the possibility of ethical whistle 
blowing by other managers, but this depends of the nature of opportunistic action they are considering. In 
our experiments project managers have completely private information on project profitability, so there is 
no chance of exposure by other managers. 
8  Five subjects failed to provide details about their gender. 
9  Six subjects failed to provide details about their age. 
10  Seven subjects failed to provide details about their work experience. 
11 No manipulation was included for the ‘Ethics Training’ factor as this could not be made directly relevant 
to the case form of the strong ethical environment manipulation. 
12  As for the reported analysis, the ethics main effect (F1,76 = 8.305, p = 0.005) and the agency main effect 
(F1,76 = 5.422, p = 0.023) were significant and the interaction was not significant. 
13  The statistical package SYSTAT 10 controls for unbalanced data sets by conducting an unweighted 
means analysis. 
